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COURT REPORTS

decision. The Corps interpreted these regulations as requiring it only
to remind applicants that they must obtain proper property rights, not
for the Corps to evaluate property disputes. The court concluded the
Corps reasonably interpreted its regulations; therefore, the Corps was
not required to evaluate Cape Wind's property interests before granting a permit.
Next, the court determined the Corps properly considered the
various impacts of the data tower on federal property as negligible.
Thus, the court rejected the Alliance's argument that erecting the data
tower contradicted public interest.
The court then addressed whether the Corps' reliance on Cape
Wind's affirmation that it would obtain the necessary property rights
was capricious, in violation of the APA. The court declined to determine whether a permit alone sufficiently authorized building on the
OCS; however, it concluded the construction of a single, temporary
data tower could not be an infringement on any federal property ownership interest in the OCS. Therefore, the court held no additional
Congressional authorization was required to proceed with the data
tower's construction.
Finally, the court addressed whether the Corps provided sufficient
notice and comment opportunities to review the proposed project.
The Alliance argued the construction of the data tower of was without
precedent, therefore requiring the Corps to make a draft FONSI available for public comment. The court rejected this argument, stating
that although this was the first data tower permit granted in these particular shoals, it was not the first physically similar structure permitted
in Massachusetts waters. Thus, the court held the Corps complied with
its requirements to engage the public in preparing the required environmental documents.
After rejecting each of the Alliance's claims, the court affirmed the
district court's summaryjudgment in favor of the Corps.
JulieM. Schmidt
Knott v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 386 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. 2004)
(denying petition for review when Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exercised proper authority over navigable watercourse, provided a
hearing, and issued orders that were not arbitrary or capricious).
Riverdale Power & Electric Company and its owner, James Knott,
(collectively "Knott") filed a petition with the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit to review three orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") concerning Knott's hydroelectric project ("Project") that included a river dam and a water
impoundment area. Knott operated the Project under a voluntary
conditional license granted by FERC pursuant to the Federal Power
Act ("FPA").
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After receiving letters alleging extreme fluctuations in the Blackstone River below the Project and concerns from state agencies and
conservation groups that these fluctuations arose from Knott's failure
to allow a continuous stream flow, FERC issued compliance orders asserting mandatory licensing authority over the Project. Specifically,
FERC ordered Knott to install gauges to measure stream flow at the
Project, and directed Knott to submit Project design revisions on microfiche cards. Knott petitioned the court for review, claiming (1)
FERC improperly asserted jurisdiction over the Project, (2) complying
with FERC orders would affect an unconstitutional taking of property,
(3) FERC denied Knott a hearing, and (4) the orders were unreasonable.
The court first assessed whether FERC possessed authority to assert
jurisdiction. The FPA required FERC to apply mandatory licensing
over projects located on navigable waters of the United States or located on a body of water regulated under Commerce Clause authority
by Congress where project construction occurred after 1935 and the
project affected interstate commerce. The court determined FERC
properly concluded the Blackstone River was suitable for interstate use
and, thus, was a navigable waterway subject to FERCjurisdiction.
The court next determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear Knott's
Fifth Amendment takings claim. Specifically, the Tucker Act and the
"Little Tucker Act" vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims, thereby barring the court from hearing the case.
On the issue of whether FERC denied Knott a hearing, the court
concluded FERC provided Knott with a hearing in a manner common
in utility and carrier regulation. In formulating its decision, FERC accepted extensive evidentiary submissions from both sides in the form
of affidavits from experts, in addition to extensive written arguments.
The court determined FERC's method was sufficient and noted a
"true" hearing before an administrative law judge was unnecessary because genuine issues of material fact could be adequately resolved on
the written record.
The court addressed Knott's claim that FERC acted unreasonably
in demanding Knott file project drawings on microfilm. The court
held FERC's order requiring Knott to submit records on microfilm to
conform to FERC's existing record-keeping system was not overly burdensome. Moreover, the court determined FERC's request was not
arbitrary or capricious in light of microfilm's durability and inexpensive cost.
The court rejected Knott's claim that FERC acted unreasonably in
requiring him to install stream flow gauges in addition to other gauges
that previously existed. The court concluded FERC's compliance order was reasonable because the other gauges were too distant to measure the Project's impacts.
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The court held there were no errors in FERC's orders and accordingly denied Knott's petition for review.
Michael Graetz

SECOND CIRCUIT
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. United States Envd. Prot. Agency, 399
F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding some provisions of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency regulation regarding concentrated
animal feeding operation violated the Clean Water Act).
Waterkeeper Alliance, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and American Littoral Society (collectively "Environmentalists") and American Farm Bureau Federation, National Chicken
Council, and National Pork Producers Council (collectively "Farmers")
challenged a regulation promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regarding water pollutants released
from concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The EPA regulation ("CAFO Rule")
follows from the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which proscribes the release of pollutants from any "point source" into navigable waters,
unless otherwise authorized by permit. The Environmentalists and
Farmers asserted the CAFO Rule violated, or failed to advance the
CWA's goals concerning the permitting scheme, the types of discharges regulated, and the effluent limitation guidelines the CAFO
Rule established.
The Environmentalists objected to the EPA's permitting scheme
because the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA to issue permits without
comprehensive review and without enough specified terms in the permits as to meet the CWA's requirements. They also objected to the
duty to apply for a permit imposed on CAFOs outside the jurisdiction
of the EPA. The CAFO Rule required large CAFOs to develop nutrient
management plans. However, the Environmentalists argued this requirement alone failed to ensure the CAFOs followed through with the
implementation of those plans. The court agreed with the Environmentalists' allegation concerning the lax standards of review for permit
issuance, allowing CAFOs to possibly misrepresent their compliance.
The court also determined the CAFO Rule violated the CWA by failing
to require CAFOs to include the terms of the nutrient management
plans in their permits. The CWA specified that effluent limitations, or
any restrictions enforced by the State regarding quantities, rates, and
concentration of discharge, must be included in the permit. The court
reasoned that the nutrient management plans constituted effluent
limitations and must be included in the permit in order to comply with
the CWA. Finally, the Farmers argued the permitting scheme outlined
in the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA power over CAFOs, or the ability to

